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As is true in most years, there have been many decisions from
the South Carolina Supreme Court during the survey year in-
volving principles of Practice and Procedure. Many of these
simply re-affirm and illustrate well established points of law.
On the other hand, this survey year has witnessed an unusually
large number of cases involving important rulings. Some em-
phasis will be placed in this article upon the facts of the indi-
vidual cases involved. This is not done simply to capsulize the
decisions for the Bar; it is, however, dictated by the author's
belief that the facts of a case often influence to an important
degree the rules of law which the court enunciates. Where es-
tablished principles are involved, the article does not dwell at
length upon the individual cases. It should be noted, however,
in passing that even these cases should be carefully analyzed
from a factual standpoint before they are relied upon as authori-
ty in any given situation.
Many of the decisions discussed in this article concern every-
day problems which a lawyer must face. This is particularly
true where any degree of trial practice is involved. For this
reason, the article emphasizes the practical approach to the de-
cisions and no attempt has been made, except in certain ir-
resistible instances, to philosophize or interpret the law.
PARTIES
A. Standing:
In four cases, the Supreme Court was presented with prob-
lems involving standing. In what is perhaps the most important
of these decisions, Doremus v. Atlantic Coast Lim R.R.,1 the
court recognized the capacity of an assignee of a part interest
in a tort claim to join, in his own name, in a legal action brought
based on the tort. Recognizing the principle that choses in action
are freely assignable under South Carolina law, 2 the court ex-
tended a right of action to such assignees in their own capacity.
There is a rather respectable body of authority which holds,
* Attorney at Law, Columbia, South Carolina.
1. 242 S.C. 123, 130 S.E.2d 370 (1963).
2. McWhirter v. Otis Elevator Co., 40 F. Supp. 11 (U.S.D.C.S.C.)
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even though it admits the assignability of such rights, that such
suits should be prosecuted in the name of the assignor.8 The im-
portance of this decision arises from the context of the problem,
however, for in Doremus, the assignment would prevent the re-
moval of the case from the state to the federal courts. Under
the doctrine of this case, any litigant could preclude federal
jurisdiction in a diversity suit by assigning a part of his claim
to a citizen from the same state as the defendant. Joined with
the already established practice of appointing administrators
from the same state as the defendant in actions brought under
the Survival and Wrongful Death Acts, this decision may lead
to some degree of forum control by the plaintiff. Yet, it must
be conceded that under the "party in interest" rule,4 the decision
is sound. Without regard to the bona fides of the assignment, it
seems reasonable that an assignee should be free to bring suit in
his own name.
Two cases involving public agencies arose in Charleston Coun-
ty. In an important decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court,
in a case of novel impression,5 affirmed the ruling of the lower
court that a restrictive covenant was such a property right as to
be compensable in cases of condemnation where damage was
established. 6 The court affirmed the decision below in which
nominal damages were awarded and refused to pass on respon-
dent's motion that the appeal be dismissed on the grounds that
the interest of the appellant had been divested pending the ap-
peal.7
3. See generally 6 C. J. S. Assignments § 124, p. 1171. These cases are based
to some extent on the desire to prevent a multiplicity of suits, reasoning that
through multiple assignments and suits, the holder of a chose in action might
seriously vex the other party. Generally, this result has been avoided by re-
quiring that all parties in interest must join in a suit against the other party.
South Carolina has always been liberal in recognizing the assignment of such
interests, as evidenced by its early recognition of the assignability of ex-
pectancies.
4. Ridgeland Box Mfg. Co. vs. Sinclair Refining Co., 216 S.C. 20, 56 S.E.2d
585 (1949).
5. School District No. 3 of Charleston County v. Country Club of Charles-
ton, 241 S.C. 215, 127 S.E.2d 625 (1962).
6. See generally 18 AM. JUR. 88, Eminent Domain, § 157.
7. Supra notes. The suit involved land which the Country Club had sold to
a partnership. The only remaining rights of the Country Club were those which
it held as mortgagee and the retained right to enforce certain restrictive
covenants imposed on the land in the sale to the partnership. As to the latter,
nominal damages were sustained, as has been discussed earlier. The mortgage
was fully satisfied during the pendency of the appeal. Under the doctrine of
Johnson v. Brandon Corp., 221 S.C. 160, 69 S.E.2d 594 (1952), respondent
moved for dismissal of the appeal on the grounds that the appeal was frivolous
and without merit, the appellant not being the party aggrieved by reason of the
divestment of its interest prior to argument.
1963]
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In the case of Dalton v. Town Council of Mt. PZeasant,8 the
court refused to allow the signatures of certain freeholders on a
petition involving a smaller area, to be counted towards the
necessary number for the annexation of a larger area in which
the smaller area was included. Plaintiff, a registered, qualified
elector, but not a freeholder, in the area proposed to be annexed,
instituted this action after the annexation had been approved by
the majority of voters in the area. On appeal, the defendant
challenged plaintiff's capacity to bring the suit since she was not
a freeholder. The Supreme Court held that this objection had
been waived since it had not been raised by answer or demurrer.9
Defendant responded that plaintiff's lack of standing deprived
the court of jurisdiction of the subject matter. Conceding plain-
tiff's standing to contest the election, the defendant argued that
since only freeholders were signatories of the petition, only they
could contest the validity of the petition. The court refused to
view so narrowly the rights of the parties involved in an an-
nexation, holding that a voter could contest both the petition
and the election and implying that a freeholder would have the
same rights.
The Supreme Court in the case of Martin v. McLeod,'10 re-
affirmed earlier decisions in which it recognized the efficacy of
a loan receipt in an insurance case.1 ' The defendant had object-
ed to the suit in plaintiff's name on the ground that the plain-
tiff's loss had been fully satisfied by its fire insurance carrier,
in whose name, it contended, suit should be brought. The trial
court struck this answer as sham and frivolous when it was es-
tablished that such payment had been cast in the form of a
loan as evidenced by a loan receipt. Like Doremus,'2 this case
is one in which the legal principle is sound but in which the
context may give attorneys some pause. At least the court has
avoided Holmes' critical aphorism "Hard cases make bad law."
8. 241 S.C. 546, 129 S.E.2d 523 (1963).
9. S. C. CODE, § 10-647 (1962).
10. 241 S.C. 71, 127 S.E.2d 129 (1962).
11. In the South Carolina cases of Phillips v. Clifton Mfg. Co., 204 S.C.
496, 30 S.E.2d 146, 157 A.L.R. 1255 (1944) and S. C. Elec. and Gas Co. v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 230 S.C. 340, 95 S.E.2d 596 (1956), the Court had quoted
with approval from the leading opinion of Justice Brandeis in Luckenback v.
McCahon Sugar Refining Co., 248, U.S. 139, 39 S.Ct. 53, 63 L.Ed. 170 which
is the landmark case holding that sums paid under such an agreement should
be regarded as loans and not as absolute payment.




Lightsey: Practice and Procedure
Published by Scholar Commons,
SVrvET or SouTr CARoLi A LAw
Joinder
In Player v. Player,13 the court refused to consider the ques-
tion of nonjoinder because this question had not been raised in
the trial court. The case is interesting on the facts and contains
an able analysis of the general principles governing equitable
assignments. The defendant had demurred on the grounds that,
insofar as the suit was against him in his representative capacity
as executor of the equitable assignor, no relief was sought from
him in such capacity. The demurrer was sustained, and no ap-
peal taken on this point. In its brief, plaintiff argued the ques-
tion of whether the defendant, in his representative capacity,
was a necessary or, at least, a proper party to an action to fore-
close an equitable lien assigned by the decedant to plaintiff.14
Since no such question was raised by the demurrer which under-
lay the present appeal, the court passed it over.
It has recently been established in South Carolina that the
State Highway Department remains liable for taking private
property without compensation even though this occurs in con-
nection with improvements on highways and streets located
within a municipality. 15 Subsequently, and in this case, the
Highway Department requires such municipalities to enter into
an agreement assuming all liability resulting from damage to
property or persons where such work is undertaken. In the case
of Robinson v. S. (. HigAway Department,' suit had been
brought against the department for damage allegedly caused to
land adjacent to a highway as a result of changes in the drain-
age system. After suit was initiated, the Highway Department
moved to have the municipality involved brought in as a party
in order that it might file a cross-complaint against it. The trial
judge denied the motion and this appeal followed. The court,
after noting that the party ultimately liable should, if possible,
be made a party to the suit in which the amount of his liability
is fixed, 17 noted that whether or not additional parties are
proper to a controversy is left to the sound discretion of the trial
judge.18 In this case, no abuse of such discretion was found,
13. 240 S.C. 274, 125 S.E.2d 636 (1962).
14. In Plaintiff's brief, this argument was grounded upon the case of People's
Bank of Hartsville v. Bryant, 148 S.C. 113, 145 S.E. 692 (1928).
15. Moseley v. S.C. Highway Dept., 236 S.C. 499, 115 S.E.2d 172 (1960).
16. 241 S.C. 137, 127 S.E.2d 286 (1962).
17. Miller & Barnhardt v. Gulf & Atlantis Ins. Co., 132 S.C. 78, 129 S.E.
131 (1925).
18. Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. v. Windham, 134 S.C. 373, 133 S.E. 35 (1926) -
Bridges v. Wyandotte Worsted Co., 239 S.C. 37, 121 S.E.2d 300 (1961).
1963]
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the court concluding that the inclusion of the new party might
increase the complexity of the facts and issues the jury must
determine. "Even though a multiplicity of actions may be avoid-
ed by the joinder of other parties, joinder will not be permitted
where plaintiff will be materially prejudiced."19
The case of Collins v. Johnson,20 which will be discussed
more fully under the following sections because of its important




Three of the four cases involving jurisdiction during the
survey year arose in the context of Domestic Relations. In the
case of McCullough v. Mcullough,21 the court held that the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Lexington County
did not have jurisdiction to grant support where the statute
creating the court did not specifically confer jurisdiction on
the court. In this regard, it is necessary to distinguish between
such statutory courts and the courts of general jurisdiction such
as Common Pleas and General Sessions, most of the latter
having been given constitutional recognition. Insofar as a court
is a creature of statue, it must find the source of all of its juris-
diction from the organic act by which it was created. If such
jurisdiction is not expressly conferred, then it does not exist and
cannot be supplied by implication.
In another case, however, a way around the above result may
have been found. When the Civil and Domestic Relations Court
of Sumter County held that the act conferring jurisdiction upon
it in bastardy cases was unconstitutional because such act was a
special law and the general law governing bastardy proceedings
could be applied, an appeal followed.22 While the appeal was
pending, the general law was amended and several sections were
specifically repealed.23 The Supreme Court felt that, without
19. Robinson v. S. C. Highway Dep't., upra note 16 at page 141, 142, 127
S.E.2d at 287, 288.
20. 242 S.C. 112, 130 S.E.2d 185 (1963).
21. 242 S.C. 108, 130 S.E.2d 77 (1963).
22. Marshall v. Richardson, 240 S.C. 318, 125 S.E2d 639 (1962).
23. S. C. CODE, § 20-303 (1962) was amended to provide, "Any able-bodied
man or man capable of earning or making a livelihood who shall, without
just cause or excuse, abandon or fail to supply the actual necessaries of life
to his wife or to his minor unmarried legitimate or illegitimate children de-
pendent upon him shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." S. C. CODE. §§ 20-305
through 20-309 (1962) were repealed.
[Vol. 16
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regard to whether or not the trial judge erred in his decision,
the decision should be reversed so that the lower court could
give consideration to the repeal of the statutes. In doing so, it
noted its prior decision to the effect that criminal enforcement
of the bastardy act was not the exclusive remedy for the enforce-
ment of the rights of children to support by their parents.
24
In the important case of Jackson v. Jackson 2 the defendant
had been held in contempt of court for failing to comply with a
court order requiring him to deliver the child of the parties to
plaintiff's parents pending the determination of the divorce
action to which the award of the child's custody was incidental.
The child had been taken out of state to defendant's parents
after the signing of the rule to show cause but before it had
been served on defendant. The appeal placed in issue the question
of "whether it is essential to the court's jurisdiction to award
custody of a child in a divorce action that the child be present
within the state or have its legal domicile, as distinguished
from actual residence, therein." The court concluded that where
both parties were residents of the state and personally be-
fore the trial court, the trial court did have jurisdiction to
adjudicate the issue of child custody. Several different ap-
proaches to this problem have been taken by the authorities.
The Restatement of the Law26 and a considerable body of
opinion2 7 follow the rule that in such cases jurisdiction is found-
ed upon the child's domicile. This conclusion is based upon the
belief that the problem of custody is one of status, similar to
the question of divorce, and that jurisdiction should, therefore,
be based on domicile. 28 Another theory, reasoning that the
court most able to determine the best interest of the child is that
of the state where the child is physically present, views the
24. Campbell v. Campbell, 200 S.C. 67, 20 S.E2d 237 (1942).
25. 241 S.C. 1, 126 S.E.2d 855 (1962).
26. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 117. See also 17A Amr. JuR., Divorce
and Separation, § 811.
27. Dougherty v. Nelson, 241 Mo.App. 121, 234 S.W.2d 353; Dorman v.
Friendly, 146 Fla. 732, 1 So.2d 734.
28. In discussing this view, the writer of one of the leading annotations has
stated: "The rationale of this position seems to be that custody is a matter
of status and that the state of domicile is the one to properly determine it. Its
weakness, in this writer's opinion, is that custody, unlike questions of divorce,
does not fit well into the concept of status, as the court is not creating or dis-
solving a legal relationship, but is making a determination as to which of
several contesting parties has the best claim to the child. However, more im-
portant from a practical point of view is the objection that the rules relating to
domicile of an infant are frequently unrealistic, giving in extreme cases juris-
diction to a court within the territorial limits of which the child has never
lived." Annot, 9 A-L.R.2d 434.
1963]
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issue of custody as in rem, the child being the res, holding that
the child must be within the jurisdiction of the court.29 As set
forth in a quotation contained in the opinion, "[t]he principal
cases and most of the secondary authorities have been concerned
less with the question whether a court has jurisdiction than with
the other question whether the courts of other states are bound
by the particular decision, when that jurisdiction has been ex-
ercised."30 Any attorney who has dealt with domestic relations
problems in any number has witnessed the unhappy effects which
such a contest may have upon the children of the parties. These
are compounded when the children are made active participants
in the parents' legal struggles. Too often such parents are more
concerned with sowing the bitter seeds of vengeance than with
their children's or even their own welfare. It certainly seems
that a proper time to determine custody is as an incident to an
action for divorce,31 for one of the most disturbing factors to
the parties undergoing the emotional experience of divorce is
the uncertainty and ambiguity of their circumstances. In this
context, finality and completeness in the adjudication are very
desirable. The requirement that both parties be personally subject
to the jurisdiction of the court should be reemphasized for it
would be unfortunate if a court were to undertake to determine
custody where the jurisdiction of the court is not based on per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant. It should be kept in mind
that, while the primary question before the court is one of the
child's best interest, the decision will affect important rights
of both parents. Custodial rights are important enough to re-
ceive statutory recognition in South Carolina 32 and any parent
realizes that such rights are beyond monetary valuation. Like
29. Coble v. Coble, 229 N.C. 81, 47 S.E.2d 798; Sheehy v. Sheehy, 88 N.H.
223, 186 A 1, 107 A.L.R. 635. See discussion in Stumberg, Children and Con-
flict of Laws, 8 UNiv. CHic. L. Rv. 42. Besides being somewhat calloused in
its enunciation, the fact that this rule would encourage just such devices as at-
tempted in this case militates heavily against it.
30. Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.2d 765, 197 P.2d 739.
31. See S. C. CODE, § 20-115 (1962). "[I]n any action for divorce from the
bonds of matrimony the court may at any stage of the cause .. .make such
orders touching the case, custody and maintenance of the children of the mar-
riage ... as from the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case
and the best spiritual as well as other interests of the children may be fit,
equitable, and just."
32. S. C. CODE, § 31-51 (1962). In the leading case of Graydon v. Graydon,
150 S.C. 117, 147 S.E. 749 (1929), it was held that the removal of a child
from the state by one parent without the knowledge or consent of the other
parent was violative of this statute. In many cases, the rationale of the Graydon
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alimony,3 3 such rights should not be determined without personal
jurisdiction.
In the only non-domestic case34 concerning jurisdiction of a
court, the Civil and Criminal Court of Charleston was involved.
Under the statute creating this court, it is specified that its
jurisdiction "shall not extend . . . to cases in chancery .... ,,3
The action involved the issue of priority between the lien of a
conditional sales contract and a distress for rent, but the ques-
tion arose in the context of an action for claim and delivery,
conceded by all to be an action at law. The Supreme Court held
that the issues were all legal in nature and, therefore, that the
court did have jurisdiction of the matter.
Venue
In the case of Basha v. Vaccamaw Lumber & Supply Co.,3 8
the court reiterated its often stated and well established position
that, while the defendant's right in a civil action to a trial in
the county of its residence is a substantial one, the convenience
of witnesses and the ends of justice may allow such venue to be
changed.3 7 A motion for a change of venue is addressed to the
discretion of the judge and his decision will not be disturbed
on appeal except for manifest abuse of such discretion." In the
principal case, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
lower court granting motion by the plaintiff for change of venue.
Legal or Equitable Nature of Issues
In two cases the court was presented with the question of
whether the nature of the issues involved were legal or equitable.
In the case of Britton v. Amos, the plaintiff moved that the
trial proceed on the basis that the issues40 were equitable in na-
ture and that, therefore, only specific issues of fact should be
33. Matheson v. McCormac, 186 S.C. 93, 195 S.E. 122 (1938).
34. Haverty Furniture Co. of Charleston v. Worthy, 241 S.C. 369, 128 S.E.2d
707 (1962).
35. S. C. CODE, § 15-1502 (1952).
36. 240 S.C. 140, 124 S.E.2d 912 (1962).
37. Dison v. Wimbly, 230 S.E. 187, 94 S.E.2d 877 (1956); King v. Moore,
231 S.C. 421, 98 S.E.2d 849 (1957). See S. C. CODE, § 10-310 (1962).
38. Graham v. Beverly, 235 S.C. 222, 110 S.E.2d 923 (1960).
40. The case involved an action brought to have a deed, absolute on its face,
declared to be a mortgage. It was alleged that the deed had been fraudulently
obtained. Recent leading South Carolina cases on this cause of action include
Howard v. Steen, 230 S.C. 351, 95 S.E.2d 613 (1956); Evans v. Evans, 226
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submitted to the jury. The trial judge did not rule specifically
against the motion, but the court felt, even if he had, that such
ruling would be without prejudice since the judge had concluded
that the plaintiff had failed to prove his alleged causes of action.
It followed that his decision on the case was as judge, regardless
of whether he was sitting in equity, or such determination was
made by an order of nonsuit.
In the case of Winter v. U. S. Fid. and Guar. Co.,41 the court
recognized that legal and equitable issues and rights could be
joined in the same complaint and that legal and equitable
remedies could be afforded in the same action. In such cases the
trial judge must decide the equitable issues sitting as a chancellor
while the legal issues are for determination by the jury.4 2 Such
causes must be materially allied in substance by the coincidence
of time, place and circumstances. Whether there is sufficient
interrelation is generally recognized to be a question for specific
application to the facts of each particular case.43 In its desire
to avoid a multiplicity of suits, however, the court recognizes
that these rules should be given a liberal construction.
Masters and SpeciaZ Referees
The court once again re-emphasized its acceptance of what
is commonly termed the "two-court rule".44 In equity matters,
findings of fact, as determined by a master or special referee
and concurred in by the referring court, will not be disturbed
on appeal unless they are without evidentiary support or are
against the clear preponderance of the evidence.4 5 In the Cox
case,40 the court also dealt with the requirement that the master
should enter his ruling on evidentiary objections so that the
reviewing court can determine the manner of arriving at the
decision. The Supreme Court ruled that if the objections were
made to a certain line of testimony or to all testimony tending
to show certain facts, a general statement of his rulings by the
referee would suffice. The court, to some extent, qualified its
decision by finding that it was unable to conclude that the party
41. 240 S.C. 561, 126 S.E.2d 724 (1962).
42. See Standard Warehouses Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 222 S.C. 93,
71 S.E.2d 893 (1952).
43. Ripley v. Rodgers, 213 S.C. 541, 50 S.E.2d 575 (1948).
44. Cox v. First Provident Corp., 240 S.C. 130, 125 S.E.2d 1 (1962).
45. See also Alderman v. Alderman, 178 S.C. 9, 181 S.E. 897, 105 A.L.R.
102 (1935).
46. Cox v. First Provident Corp., mipra note 44.
[Vol. 16
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had been prejudiced, which brings to mind the ancient English
couplet:
"Every barrister need live in terror of 'lack of prejudice'
and 'harmless error.'"
The case of Hampton v. Dodson,47 is an extremely important
decision involving an attack on the real estate reassessment
program in School District No. 1 of Richland County. Pro-
cedurally, the case enunciates two important rules, neither novel
but still so crucial as to justify some emphasis. The action was
brought to enjoin county officials from proceeding with the re-
assessment program. After findings and conclusions of the mas-
ter had been affirmed, with certain modifications, by the circuit
court, this appeal was taken. The appellants were not allowed to
question the constitutionality of the act because no issue there-
about had been raised before the master.
It is a general rule applicable in civil cases that a constitu-
tional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity, or
it will be considered as waived. 12 C.J. 785; See also 16
C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 96; Salley v. Mcoy, 186 S.C.
1, 195 S.E. 132; Hurst v. Sumter County, 189 S.C. 376, 1
S.E.2d 238.
The above ruling may be tempered where reference is had
only for the taking of testimony. In such a case, it would seem
that the constitutional attack could be withheld until the trial
forum is reached.
Although the court expressly held in Hampton v. Dodso 48
that the findings of fact by the master concurred in by the circuit
judge were completely supported by the record, it noted that
such findings had either not been challenged or that the ex-
ceptions thereto had been abandoned. In such a case, a finding
to the effect that the reassessment program was valid under the
general law, precluded any injunction since the Special Act's
constitutionality need not be considered. The court will not pass
upon the constitutionality of legislative action unless such is
necessary to the decision.49
In the case of School Dist. No. 10 of Charleston County v.
Wallace,50 the action was one of condemnation. The matter was
47. 240 S.C. 532, 126 S.E2d 564 (1962).
48. Ibid.
49. Bellamy v. Johnson, 234 S.C. 172, 107 S.E.2d 33 (1959).
50. 241 S.C. 323, 128 S.E.2d 167 (1962).
1963]
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referred to a special referee, who filed his report over six years
later, clearly a violation of the thirty day statutory time limit.51
The court held, however, that the special referee's failure to
comply did not automatically end the reference or deprive the
special referee of jurisdiction. While he might have been removed
or required to make his report upon the application of either
party, whether or not the report would be received and con-
sidered after the expiration of the statutory time limit was a
matter within the discretion of the lower court. The decision of
the lower court to receive the report for consideration was af-
firmed.
The case of Dalton v. Town Council of Mt. Pleasant52 has
been commented upon earlier under the heading of "Standing."
The court in this case noted the well established rule that
"questions not raised before the master and to which no exception
to his report has been filed are not properly before the circuit
court for consideration."53
Counter claims
Perhaps the most important decision of the survey year from
the standpoint of trial procedure is the case of Collins v. John-
son." The issue presented to the court was whether or not the
statute governing the filing of counterclaims was mandatory
or permissive.55 Factually, the case arose when the car of Collins
was involved in a wreck with a bus. Suit was first filed against
51. An important prerequisite to the court's decision was a determination
of which time limit to apply. In the case, the special referee was also the Master
for Charleston County. Under the general provisions governing reports of
Masters, the time for filing is within sixty days from the time that the action is
finally submitted to the Master. S. C. CODE, §§ 10-1413 and 10-1414 (1952). It
was on this basis that the trial court had held that the report was timely filed.
The Supreme Court held that the Master was in this case a special referee,
only, and that the provisions of the Public Works Eminent Domain Law gov-
erned under its terms:
The report of the special master must be filed with the Clerk of Court in
which the proceeding is pending within thirty days after the date of the
taking of the oath, unless further time is granted by the Court. The Court
shall grant additional time for the filing of the report only on a showing
that the report cannot, with all due diligence be prepared within the time
fixed. S. C. CODE, § 25-123 (1952).
52. 241 S.C. 546, 129 S.E.2d 523 (1963).
53. White v. Livingston, 231 S.C. 301, 98 S.E.2d 534 (1957).
54. 242 S.C. 112, 130 S.E.2d 185 (1963).
55. S. C. CODE §§ 10-657 and 10-705 (1962). After some consideration, the
court concluded that the latter statute was applicable.
In all actions sounding in tort the defendant shall have the right to plead
a similar cause of action against the plaintiff by way of counterclaim if
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Collins on behalf of the busline. He answered but interposed no
counterclaim. Thereafter, this action was instituted in his forum.
The lower court dismissed the second action on the grounds that
there was an abatement by the pendency of the first action. The
Supreme Court held that the statute was permissive and, thus,
reversed the lower court. The court laid particular stress upon
the legislative history of the act.56 There had been a previous
division over this same question centered around Section 10-652
of the 1962 Code. In a concurring opinion in the case of Kirven
v. Virginia-Carolina Ohem. Co., 5 Mr. Justice Woods had argued
for permissive counterclaims. In the same case, the dissent of
Chief Justice Pope took the opposite view. It seems to the author
that this decision is a needed correction to our trial procedures.
Too often, in the past, tort actions have been instituted for the
sole purpose of seizing the tactical advantage of making the
other party depend upon a counterclaim. This decision will do
a great deal to correct this abuse. The critical problem, however,
arises when the question is presented as to whether an affirmative
defense of contributory negligence will bar a later counterclaim.
Certainly, it would put in issue the same questions as would a
later action in tort against the plaintiff. Thus, the defendant
may have to risk a defense without asserting contributory neg-
ligence in order to avoid a later argument of res judicata. At
any rate, this decision leaves the matter clearly up to the at-
torney. It should be regarded as a substantial betterment in the




In the case of Lee v. Peek, 8 the defendant failed to demur
or answer within the proper time. The defendant had filed a
motion for a change of venue in which he had reserved his right
to demur or otherwise answer. Of course, this action did not
dispense with the necessity for filing an answer or demurrer.
Thereafter, the plaintiff filed notice that he would apply for
default judgment. The lower court refused to allow default
judgment and granted additional time to the defendants to
56. Prior to this statute, our practice did not permit the interposition of a
counterclaim in an action ex delicto, Miller v. Johnson, 126 S. C. 321, 119 S.E.
902 (1923).
57. 77 S.C. 493, 58 S.E. 424 (1907).
58. 240 S.C. 203, 126 S.E.2d 353 (1962).
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answer or demur. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that
it was a matter within the discretion of the trial judge.59 The
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Lewis warns, however, against
too broad a reliance upon the trial judge's quality of mercy.
Where the default has arisen from an attorney allowing his
client to get ther through a mistake as to the proper procedure,
he would allow relief.60 Where, however, default results from
inaction of counsel on behalf of his client or the failure to ex-
ercise due diligence in the protection of the client's interest, this
is not sufficient grounds for relief.61 It should be noted that
in this case the defendant had a meritorious defense. In seeking
relief, it is necessary for the party seeking leave of court to show
a meritorious defense to the action.
Joinder, Misjoinder, Redundancy and Motions to Strike
In the case of Omman v. Profitt,62 the plaintiff had brought
suit to enforce covenants contained in an employment contract.
The defendant moved to have the plaintiff state separately his
causes of action because there were two covenants involved. The
lower court refused the motion. On appeal, the Supreme Court
affirmed stating that where the "facts alleged show one primary
right of plaintiff and one wrong by defendant which involves
that right, plaintiff has stated but a single cause of action."
63
The soundness of the decision under the facts of this case can-
not be doubted. The author, however, would caution against too
loose practice in the joining of several causes in one cause of
action. The trial courts and practicing bar have too often con-
59. The distinction between S. C. CoDE §§ 10-609 and 10-1213 should be em-
phasized. The latter statute deals with relief after judgment or order and re-
quires a showing of mistake, inadvertance, surprise or excusable neglect. The
former statute provides for relief before judgment or order and does not require
such a showing. A discussion of this important distinction may be found in the
case of Roberts v. Drayton, 121 S.C. 124, 116 S.E. 744 (1922). The principal
case contains an extensive listing and discussion of the cases dealing with mat-
ters of discretion. In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Lewis takes issue with
the starkness of the distinction drawn by the majority between the two statutes.
60. McGhee v. One Chevrolet Sedan, 235 S.C. 37, 109 S.E.2d 713 (1960);
Savage v. Cannon, 204 S.C. 473, 30 S.E.2d 70 (1944); Johnson v. Finger,
102 S.C. 354, 86 S.E. 673 (1915) ; McSween v. Windham, 77 S.C. 223, 57 S.E.
847 (1907).
61. Strickland v. Rabon, 234 S.C. 48, 107 S.E.2d 344 (1959); Simon v.
Flowers, 231 S.C. 545, 99 S.E.2d 391 (1957); Poston v. S. C. Highway Dep't.,
192 S.C. 137, 5 S.E.2d 729 (1939); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Sightler, 131
S.C. 241, 127 S.E. 13 (1925); Claussen v. Johnson, 32 S. C. 86, 11 S.E. 209
(1890).
62. 241 S.C. 28, 126 S.E.2d 852 (1962).
63. Holcombe v. Garland & Denwiddie, Inc., 162 S.C. 379, 160 S.E. 881
(1931); Wright v. Willoughby, 79 S.C. 438, 60 S.E. 971 (1908).
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fused this area by joining in one stated cause alternative theories
for relief. Under our liberal treatment of the doctrine of election
of remedies,64 it is important that distinct causes, although prop-
erly joinable, should be separately stated. To confuse the ques-
tion of "joinder" with the question of "splitting causes of ac-
tion" is a frequent error. Good pleading requires that the at-
torney respect the distinctness of the several theories which he
follows. Only through such respect for form can we hope to re-
tain the freedom to join varying theories of relief that are now
allowed and the author feels that this is one of the most salient
practices of our law.
The case of J.MS., Inc. v. Theo, 5 reaffirmed the principle
that a motion to strike is addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial judge. Where there are allegations in the answer un-
related to the theory of the complaint or the damages thereunder,
they should be stricken. In like manner, the court affirmed the
lower court's decision striking a defense which was merely a
repetition of another defense. The allegations were held to be
redundant, i.e. superfluous, superabundant, excessive.
Prayer
The court reiterated its well established rule that the prayer
of a complaint is not a part thereof for the purpose of giving
it character or fixing the liability of the parties. 66 By the same
rule, the plaintiffs may obtain any relief appropriate to the
case as made by the pleadings and the evidence, without regard
to the form of the prayer for relief. 7
Amendment
In two cases the court dealt with amendment of pleadings.
The case of Robinson v. S. C. Highway Dept.,68 has been com-
mented on previously. The lower court had allowed plaintiff to
file an amended complaint but his order was silent as to de-
fendant's permission to file an answer thereto. The Supreme
64. The Supreme Court has frequently reiterated its rule that only causes
which are inconsistent may not be joined. Barnwell Production Credit Assoc.
v. Hartzog, 231 S.C. 340, 98 S.E.2d 835 (1956). Even where an election of
remedies is made, the plaintiff may later proceed under the alternative theory
if the first cause is lost. The court has stated repeatedly that a party is not
bound and barred from later action if he erroneously chooses to proceed under
a faulty theory.
65. 241 S.C. 394, 128 S.E.2d 697 (1963).
66. Burnett v. Boukedes, 240 S.C. 144, 125 S.E.2d 10 (1962).
67. Sheppard v. Green, 48 S.C. 165, 26 S.E. 224 (1897).
68. 241 S.C. 137, 127 S.E.2d 286 (1962).
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Court refused to reverse on this ground but itself granted leave
to file.
In the case of Hicks v. Giles,6 9 the court recognized that the
allowance of amendment to pleadings is a matter for the ex-
ercise of the trial court's discretion. Such discretion is so broad
that, although not unlimited, it will rarely be disturbed. The
lower court had refused to allow the defendant to orally amend
his answer after there had been considerable progress made into
the course of the hearings. One early case had reversed the lower
court for allowing an amendment under almost identical cir-
cumstances.1 0
Demurrers
In Player v. Player 7' and O man v. Profitt,72 both of which
have been discussed above, the court dealt with a demurrer. Both
simply restate the well established rule that the allegations of a
complaint will be taken as true and will be liberally construed
in favor of the pleader where a demurrer is being passed upon.
TRIAL
Continuance
In one case, the court reaffirmed that a motion for a con-
tinuance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge
whose ruling will not be disturbed in absence of abuse."
8
Mistrial
The previous case is more important for its holding that a
mistrial need not be granted where insurance is inadvertently
injected into a personal injury case. It was noted, however, that
the comment was made by the defendant's own witness in re-
sponse to inquiry by defendant's counsel. The trial judge had
instructed the jury to disregard any reference to insurance. The
court refused to follow the rule of almost automatic mistrial
where plaintiff's counsel deliberately injects information to the
effect that the defendant has liability insurance.74 There can be
69. 241 S.C. 129, 127 S.E.2d 196 (1962).
70. McRae v. David, 7 Rich. Eq. 375.
71. 240 S.C. 274, 125 S.E.2d 636 (1962).
72. 241 S.C. 28, 126 S.E.2d 852 (1962).
73. Norton v. Ewaskio, 241 S.C. 557, 129 S.E.2d 517 (1963).
74. The Court relied heavily on these earlier South Carolina decisions.
Vollington v. So. Paving Const. Co., 166 S.C. 448, 165 S.E. 184 (1932);
Breazeale v. Piedmont Manufacturing Co., 184 S.C. 471, 193 S.E. 39 (1937);
McLeod v. Rose, 231 S.C. 209, 97 S.E.2d 899 (1957).
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no quarrel with the court's decision. To hold otherwise would
place it within the power of any unconscionable defendant to
force a mistrial. It would still remain a matter of discretion for
the court and it would seem that some situations might exhibit
such great prejudice that a mistrial would be justified. Under
these facts, however, the ruling was correct. By way of contrast
to the Norton case, supra, the case of Crocker v. Weathers.75 in-
volved remarks made in argument by plaintiff's counsel. The
court reiterated:
It is highly improper for counsel, in argument, to advise
the jury directly or by insinuation that the defendant is
covered by insurance. Where it is sufficiently clear that in-
surance is implied by argument of counsel, this Court will
not hesitate to reverse a judgment obtained where such an
argument is made.76
The trial judge had refused to order a mistrial and the Su-
preme Court affirmed. The matter is left very much to the dis-
cretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed unless there
has been an abuse of discretion.
Burden of Proof
In several cases, which will receive only cursory comment,
the court reaffirmed well established principles regarding burden
of proof. As to the issues of the action, the burden of proof
generally follows the burden of pleading. Thus, the plaintiff has
the burden on his action,77 while the defendant has the burden on
affirmative defenses and counterclaims.78 South Carolina has
steadfastly refused to accept the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor and
there are, therefore, few exceptions to this rule. One exception
falls in the area of bailments for hire and was again recognized
in the case of Bhorelands Freezers, Inc. v. Textile Ice & Fuel
75. 240 S.C. 412, 126 S.E.2d 335 (1962).
76. This rule stems from doctrine enunciated by Mr. Justice Woods in the
case of Horsford v. Carolina Glass Co., 92 S.C. 236, 75 S.E. 533 (1912). For
many years it has received almost mechanical application. It is encouraging to
see the courts using some discretion in its enforcement, for a mistrial is a very
serious matter to the litigant. Unless the prejudice is undue, and especially in
view of the more modem universality of coverage, it would seem that such a
harsh purgative might not be prescribed.
77. Garrett v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 241 S.C. 299, 128 S.E.2d 171 (1962) ; Cole-
man v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 241 S.C. 384, 128 S.E.2d 699 (1962).
78. Hoffman v. Greenville County, 242 S.C. 34, 129 S.E.2d 757 (1963); Cox
v. First Provident Corp., 240 S.C. 130, 125 S.E.2d 1 (1962).
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Co.70 Under this rule, once the bailor proves delivery of the
chattels to the bailee in good condition and their loss or return
in damaged condition, he has made a prima facie case and the
burden shifts to the bailee to show that he used ordinary care
in the storage and safekeeping of the property.
Argunwnts
The case of Crocker v. "Weathers"0 has received earlier dis-
cussion which will not be repeated here except to note that it
dealt with the question of counsel's argument injecting the fact
of the defendant's insurance into the case.
In the case of South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Meredith,"'
the plaintiff objected strenuously to the argument of defendant's
counsel. The record was not complete and the court remanded
the case and directed the trial judge to give some settlement to
it. It is necessary for the objecting party to make certain that
the record clearly reflects the objectionable language.
8 2
In any event, the relief for improper argument is left to con-
trol of the trial judge to a considerable degree and will not be
disturbed unless there has been an abuse of discretion.8 3
Charges
In charging the jury, it is the duty of the trial judge to state
the nature of the action and the issues arising thereunder. He
may charge as to what is not in issue and give cautionary in-
structions thereon if such do not prejudice either party.84 Where
there is no proof on an issue, the trial judge should properly
refrain from charging as to it.s5 If this is done, however, there
will not be a reversal unless the error is prejudicial.86 Where,
however, the trial judge charged that neither of two streets
79. 241 S.C. 537, 129 S.E.2d 424 (1963). The fountainhead of this doctrine
may be found in the case of Gilford v. Peter's Dry Cleaning Co., 195 S.C. 417,
11 S.E.2d 857 (1940).
80. 240 S.C. 412, 126 S.E.2d 335 (1962).
81. 241 S.C. 306, 128 S.E.2d 179 (1962).
82. State v. Robinson, 238 S.C. 140, 119 S.E.2d 671 (1961); Lawrence v.
Southern Ry., 169 S.C. 1, 167 S.E. 839 (1933); Tunstall v. Lerner Shops, Inc.,
160 S.C. 557, 119 S.E. 671 (1923).
83. Shearer v. DeShon, 240 S.C. 472, 126 S.E.2d 514 (1962).
84. Ibid. In this case, the judge had charged that an action for wrongful death
was a civil case for damages and that verdict had no criminal implication. The
charge was held proper.
85. Hoffman v. County of Greenville, 242 S.C. 34, 129 S.E.2d 757 (1963).
86. Doremus v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 242 S.C. 123, 130 S.E.2d 370
(1963). Guthke v. Morris, 242 S.C. 56, 129 S.E.2d 782 (1963).
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was a through street and failed to charge as to the rights and
duties of two motorists meeting at such an intersection, the Su-
preme Court reversed the lower court. sT
EVIDENCE
Experiments
Today, experiments are becoming an important weapon in the
arsenal of the trial attorney. Increasingly this form of demon-
strative evidence is finding use to bring to the jury a better
understanding of difficult factual or mechanical concepts. In
the case of McDowell v. Floyd,8 the Supreme Court refused
to allow the introduction of testimony resulting from such an ex-
periment where such experiment was made under conditions or
circumstances not similar to those prevailing at the time of the
occurrence involved in the controversy.89 The case seems to be
sound in law and principle.
Res Ip8a Loguitor
In the case of Bellamy v. Hardee,90 the court again restated
that South Carolina does not follow the doctrine of res ipsa
loguitor. This rule has been relaxed only in the area of the bail-
ment cases which have been discussed above.
Negligence per se
"The violation of an applicable statute is negligence per se,
and whether or not such breach contributed as a proximate cause
to plaintiff's injury is ordinarily a question for the jury."91
Exceptions to the hearsay -rule
There were four cases involving this area which will undoubt-
ediy be considered individually in the article on evidence. Two
involved the admission exception,92 one involved an extensive
discussion of the related res gestae exception, 93 and one concerned
testimony taken at a former trial.9 4
87. Eberhardt v. Forrester, 241 S.C. 399, 128 S.E.2d 687 (1962).
88. 240 S.C. 158, 125 S.E.2d 4 (1963).
89. 20 Am. JuR. 628, Evidence, § 756.
90. 242 S.C. 71, 129 S.E.2d 905 (1963).
91. Hicks v. Coleman, 240 S.C. 223, 125 S.E2d 470 (1962).
92. Eberhardt v. Forrester, 241 S.C. 399, 129 S.E.2d 687 (1963); Marshall
v. Thomason, 241 S.C. 84, 127 S.E2d 177 (1962).
93. Marshall v. Thomason, supra note 92.
94. Gaines v. Thomas, 241 S.C. 412, 128 S.E.2d 692 (1962).
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StipuZations
If a case is submitted upon a factual stipulation, the court
may draw any reasonable and legitimate inferences therefrom.95
DIRECTED VERDICTS AND NEW TRIALS
The law in this area has been long settled and, therefore, only
a general summary will be included. It is clear that motions of
this type are addressed to the sound discretion of the court and
the exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed unless it has
been abused.97 The trial judge, however, may not direct a verdict
where there are questions of fact, and if the evidence is conflict-
ing or different inferences can reasonably be drawn therefrom,
the issue should be submitted to the jury.98 On motions for non-
suit and/or directed verdict for defendant, the evidence must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.9
It is important, however, that the trial attorney take such
steps as are necessary to preserve his grounds for a new trial. He
should see, where his grounds are based upon unfair or improper
argument, that the objectionable language used, at least in sub-
stance, is preserved in the record.100
In perhaps the most important case of the survey period in-
volving this topic, Brown v. Finger,' the court also dealt
with the question of remittitur. The case involved a suit brought
by a husband for loss of consortium as a result of defendant's
allegedly having willfully and maliciously administered narcotics
to his wife. A substantial verdict was rendered in the trial court.
On motion for a new trial, the trial judge ordered a remittitur
and plaintiff complied. Thereafter, defendant appealed. The Su-
preme Court reversed on the grounds that testimony of the wife's
95. Garrett v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 241 S.C. 299, 128 S.E.2d 171 (1962).
96. Id.; Bruce v. Blalock, 241 S.C. 155, 127 S.E.2d 439 (1962).
97. Norton v. Evaskio, 241 S.C. 557, 129 S.E.2d 517 (1963). Shearer v. De-
Shon, 240 S.C. 472, 126 S.E.2d 514 (1962).
98. Coleman v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 241 S.C. 304, 128 S.E.2d 699
(1962); Horton v. Greyhound Corp., 241 S.C. 430, 128 S.E.2d 776 (1962);
Johnston Cotton Co. v. Cannon, 242 S.C. 42, 129 S.E.2d 750 (1963); Norton
v. Evaskio, supra note 97; Shearer v. DeShon, mupra note 97; Guthrie v.
Morriss, 242 S.C. 56, 129 S.E.2d 732 (1963); McDowell v. Floyd, 240 S.C.
158, 125 S.E.2d 4 (1962).
99. Bellamy v. Hardee, 242 S.C. 71, 129 S.E.2d 905 (1963); Young v. Bost,
241 S.C. 289, 128 S.E.2d 118 (1962); Barnhill v. Bankers Fire & Marine Ins.
Co,, 240 S.C. 325, 125 S.E.2d 809 (1962); Hicks v. Coleman, 240 S.C. 223,
125 S.E.2d 470 (1962).
100. S. C. Hiway Dep't. v. Meredith, 241 S.C. 306, 128 S.E.2d 179 (1962).
101. 240 S.C. 102, 124 S.E.2d 781 (1962).
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separate earnings should not have been admitted.10 2 The remit-
titur in the lower court had been based on this factor. The Su-
preme Court, recognizing the right of the trial court to order a
new trial nisi, unless the plaintiff remit a portion of his ver-
dict,103 held that this was not proper where the error was the sub-
mission or an improper element of damage and the effect of such
error was incapable of calculation.' 04 In such cases, the new
trial must be granted unconditionally.10 5
RES JUDICATA AND LAW OF THE CASE
Res Judicata
Three cases were decided involving principles of res judicata.
In the case of Lancaster v. SmithCo, Inc.,'0 6 the plaintiffs had
brought a previous action for fraud and deceit in which they had
taken an involuntary nonsuit.'0 7 The present action was brought
on the theory of breach of warranty. The lower court had grant-
ed judgment on the pleadings upon the grounds of res judicata
and election of remedies. The court held that although the facts
alleged were substantially identical to those in the earlier action,
the earlier judgment was not res judicata. Where the former
judgment involves nothing more than a judgment of nonsuit for
failure of evidence to establish one of the material allegations
of the complaint, it would not amount to a judgment on the
merits of the action and would not support a plea of res ju-
dicata.:' s Although there is some loose language in the decision,
the court, in substance, is stating that where the former suit was
lost for want of proof of one element, that judgment is not res
102. While it may be regarded as settled that South Carolina recognizes that
a husband may sue for loss of consortium, Cook v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.,
196 S.C. 230, 13 S.E2d 1, 133 A.L.R. 1144 (1941), the Supreme Court had
earlier held that the South Carolina Married Women's Acts, S. C. CODE §§ 20-
204 (1952), removed her separate earnings from the elements of damages under
that cause of action. Bryant v. Smith, 187 S.C. 453, 198 S.E. 20 (1938). The
remedy for the wife's loss of earnings is in the form of a separate suit brought
by her. S. C. CODE § 10-216 (1952).
103. Anderson v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 175 S.C. 254, 178 S.E. 819
(1935).
104. Where the effect of the error can be segregated or calculated, the court
will allow a remittitur. For cases allowing this, see: Johnston v. Bogger, 151
S.C. 537, 149 S.E. 241 (1929); Currie v. Davis, 130 S.C. 408, 126 S.E. 119
(1923) ; Tucker v. Buffalo Cotton Mills, 76 S.C. 539, 57 S.E. 626 (1907).
105. See 66 C.J.S., New Trial, § 209.
106. 241 S.C. 451, 128 S.E.2d 915 (1962)
107. The previous action was the subject of an appeal in Lancaster v.
Smithco, Inc., 238 S.C. 15, 119 S.E.2d 145 (1960).
108. Whetsell v. Sovereign Corp. W. 0. W., 188 S.C. 106, 198 S.E. 153
(1938); McCown v. Muldrow, 91 S.C. 523, 74 S.C. 479.
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judicata unless the same element of proof is required to sub-
stantiate the second cause of action. Only in such a case could
the former action be said to have been a determination on the
merits of the second cause.
In the case of Hicks v. Giles,109 the question of res judicata
was dealt with obliquely when the trial court refused to allow
the defendant to amend his answer in the middle of a second
reference. The matter had already been adjudicated and de-
termined by an earlier order of the court. This case has been
discussed more fully under Pleadings, Amendments.
Finally, in the case of Kinard v. Polk,n0 the Supreme Court
held that a judgment against the drivers of two automobiles in-
volved in an accident did not bar a later action by one against
the other. The case was one of novel impression. The rule ac-
cords with the weight of authority elsewhere,111 although the
statutes in South Carolina do allow a permissive cross suit.
1 1 2 It
appears to be a sound principle to follow, although in some cases
it could well result in a multiplicity of suits. Such a considera-
tion, however, should not prevent the party, through his at-
torney, from choosing his forum and the posture of his case.
Law of the Case
In the case of Commercial Credit Corp. v. McAdams,'" the
court reiterated the rule that contentions which are decided by
an order from which no appeal has been taken become the law
of the case and are not reviewable in the Supreme Court when
a subsequent appeal is brought following trial judge's refusal
to dismiss the complaint.
In the case of Corster v. Wilson,114 the court continued its
adherence to its well-established rule that the conclusions of law
and findings of fact of a special referee become the law of the
case if not properly excepted to,"r and, thus, will not be re-
viewed by the Appellate Court.
109. 241 S.C. 129, 127 S.E.2d 196 (1962).
110. 241 S.C. 555, 129 S.E.2d 527 (1963).
111. 50 C.J.S., Judgments, § 819; 30 Ams. Jun., § 411; RESTATEMENT OF
JUDGMENTS, § 82; See Annot. 152 A.L.R. 1066.
112. S.C. CODE, § 10-707 (1962).
113. 241 S.C. 532, 129 S.E.2d 429 (1963).
114. 241 S.C. 516, 129 S.E.2d 431 (1963).
115. See S.C. CODE, §§ 10-1412 and 1511 (1962). Also Cmcurr COURT RULE
16. The recent leading case of Kerr v. City of Columbia, 232 S.C. 405, 102
S.E.2d 364 (1957) fully in accord with the present case.
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CONCLUSION
This concludes the survey of decisions in South Carolina in-
volving practice and procedure that were determined by the state
Supreme Court. As is so often true, there are many cases of only
passing or individual interest. There are a few of general interest
and one or two that establish important new principles of law.
But there are altogether too many cases where the rights of the
litigants were lost through inept or careless use of procedure.
While it is easy to lose sight of the requirements of our code of
practice, even fashionable to sneer at the technicalities of this
non-substantive part of the law, attorneys should not lose sight
of the fact that it is only within the framework of these rules
that the principles of substantive decisions absorb meaning. Rules
of law are, as has been well said, "secreted in the interstices of
procedure." It is the author's opinion that these facts of legal
life, the every day tools of the practicing attorney, have been
too long slighted both in our legal education, and, as inexorably
follows, in our subsequent service at the bar. It has been said
of our sister profession, medicine, that the discovery of the life-
saving but panacean anti-biotics destroyed the art of diagnostics.
Might it not also be said of law that we, in the revolution against
the overly technical concepts of common-law pleading, stand in
danger of annihilating our legal procedure. To do so might prove
fatal, because law finds its justification only in the ordering of
the rules of conduct of society and the individual, and there
can be no order where there is no well-defined procedure.
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